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The Difficulty in Defining Constitutional Standards
for State Prisoners' Claims of Inadequate Medical
Treatment
INTRODUCTION
State prisoners have a constitutional right under the eighth
amendment' to receive adequate medical care and may enforce this
right by bringing suit in federal court under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.2 The principles of the eighth amendment em-
body the concepts of dignity, humanity, and decency,3 and hold as
incompatible with these ideals those punishments which conflict
with "evolving standards of decency. "4 The eighth amendment pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted by the
courts thus establishes the obligation of prison authorities to pro-
vide medical care for those being punished by incarceration; the
failure to do so results in the infliction of unnecessary suffering
which is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.'
.Courts utilize the standard of "deliberate indifference to serious
1. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The
eighth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 with its broad range of remedies, including
monetary damages and equitable relief, provides a federal forum for the redress of constitu-
tional deprivations resulting from state action. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law,
sued in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
Id.
Jurisdiction in these suits is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), granting the district court
original jurisdiction in cases involving deprivations of civil rights.
A § 1983 action, commonly called a civil rights action, is different from a habeas corpus
action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The civil rights prisoner-plaintiff
alleges that the conditions of confinement violate the federal constitution; whereas, the ha-
beas petitioner is usually seeking release from custody. A habeas petitioner is required by 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) to exhaust state remedies; this is not a requirement under § 1983.
3. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th
Cir. 1968).
4. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
5. 429 U.S. at 102-04.
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medical needs"6 in determining whether a constitutional volation
has occurred. Although this test was promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Estelle v. Gamble,7 it was basically a reaffirmation of exist-
ing circuit law;' further, the meaning and application of this test
were not explicitly defined. Due to the Supreme Court's failure in
Estelle to give sufficient guidelines for application of the standard
it is necessary to factually analyze the cases which have applied this
standard in order to determine what constitutes "deliberate indif-
ference." The difficulties inherent in the case by case application
of the standard give rise to the criticism that it is ineffective and
devoid of meaning.
Countervailing policy considerations make the search for a consti-
tutional standard more elusive. The recognition that prisoners re-
tain some constitutional rights during incarceration and that prison
conditions can constitute punishment that offends society's evolv-
ing standards of decency justifies the broad remedial provisions of
section 1983 relief.0 and federal court intervention. On the other
hand, federal courts have historically been reluctant to interfere
with the administration and internal discipline of state correctional
institutions." Additionally, courts fear that a constitutional tort of
medical malpractice will be created,"2 thus giving state prisoners a
federal remedy which far exceeds those available to the ordinary
citizen in medical malpractice suits.
This comment focuses on the application of the "deliberate indif-
ference" standard in four typical areas of prisoner complaints: -the
claim of inadequate medical teatment; the denial of medical treat-
6. Id. at 104 (1976).
7. Id.
8. The Supreme Court noted: "The Courts of Appeals are in essential agreement with this
standard. All agree that mere allegations of malpractice do not state a claim, and, while their
terminology regarding what is sufficient varies, their results are not inconsistent with the
standard of deliberate indifference." Id. at 106 n.14.
9. See Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 92, 119 (1977). "In view of the absence of a viable state
remedy, . . . deliberate indifference . operates to deny state prisoners redress for inade-
quate medical treatment." Id.
10. See note 2 supra. Both monetary and equitable relief are permitted.
11. This concept is known as the "hands-off doctrine," and is a policy of judicial absten-
tion in matters related to the internal discipline of prison management in the absence of a
clear abuse of discretion. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970) for a discussion of the hands-off doctrine.
f2. 429 U.S. at 106. "[Mjedical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation
merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id. See note 13 infra.
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ment; the denial of prescribed medical treatment; and the inade-
quacy of the prison medical treatment facilities as a whole. A thor-
ough analysis of these areas will reveal the problems inherent in the
"deliberate indifference" standard, and, with respect to individual
claims, a more realistic and appropriate standard will be advocated.
Finally it will be seen that the dangers of creating a constitutional
tort of medical malpractice are nonexistent when the claim involved
alleges the inadequacy of medical treatment facilities as a whole.
I. Estelle v. Gamble ANb DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Prior to Estelle, some courts sought to avoid the creation of a
constitutional tort of medical malpractice 3 by emphasizing defen-
dant's wrongful intent, while other courts were concerned with ade-
quate treatment, abuse of discretion, or exceptional circumstan-
ces. 1
The Supreme Court, in recognizing an eighth amendment cause
of action for state prisoners under section 1983, adopted the
"deliberate indifference" standard in Estelle v. Gamble,'3 but in
doing so, the court relied to a great extent on previous decisions by
the circuits which utilized a similar standard, although it was not
always referred to as "deliberate indifference."' 6
In Estelle the prisoner-plaintiff received a back injury on his work
13. Robinson v. Jordan, 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974); Kauffman v. Johnston, 454 F.2d 264
(3d Cir. 1972); Nettles v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Prasse, 450 F.2d
946 (3d Cir. 1971); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
14. Robinson v. Jordan; 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal to order X-rays coupled with
insulting racial slur); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Kauffman v. Johnston,
454 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1972) (allegation of malice); Shields v. Kunkel, 442 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.
1971); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975); Newsome v. Sielaff, 375 F. Supp.
1189 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (deliberate denial of necessary medical treatment). See also Hampton
v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976) (decided after EsteUe).
15. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
16. See note 8 supra. The Supreme Court noted that the following cases were in essential
accord with Estelle, although terminology varied:
Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541,
544 (2d Cir. 1974) (deliberate indifference); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d
Cir. 1970); Russell v. Shaeffer, 528 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1975); Newman v. Alabama, 503
F.2d 1320, 1330 n.14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1974) (callous indifference);
Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151,158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon,
419 U.S. 879 (1974); Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1975) (deliberate
indifference); Tolbert v. Eyman, 424 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970); Dewell v. Lawson,
489 F.2d 877, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1974).
429 U.S. at 106 n.14.
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assignment when a bale of cotton fell on him. During a three month
span he was seen by medical personnel on seventeen occasions, and
was treated for his back injury, high blood pressure, and heart prob-
lems. 7 The Supreme Court noted that the government has an obli-
gation to provide medical care for those it is punishing by incarcera-
tion, that denial of medical care causes pain and suffering inconsist-
ent with contemporary standards of decency, and concluded that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates
the eighth amendment."8 The Court clearly indicated that a consti-
tutional violation would occur whether this indifference was mani-
fested by prison doctors in response to prisoner's needs, by the
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical
care, or by intentional interference with the course of treatment
once it was prescribed. 9 In recognizing that the eighth amendment
could be broadly interpreted to include prisoner suits based on med-
ical treatment, 0 the Court narrowly defined the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard as including only the wanton infliction of unneces-
sary pain and not circumstances involving the inadvertent failure
to provide medical care. 21 Thus a complaint of negligence in diagno-
sis or treatment would continue to be construed as a claim of medi-
cal malpractice and not a constitutional violation, since the mere
fact that a prisoner is involved does not elevate the tort to a consti-
tutional violation. The keynote for stating a cognizable claim under
Estelle was prescribed to be an allegation of acts or omissions suffi-
ciently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. Only indifference of this character would be sufficient to
offend the "evolving standards of decency" concept 2 which is inher-
17. Id. at 99-101.
18. Id. at 104-05.
19. Id.
20. Prior to Estelle, actions were usually predicated on either the eighth or fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amend-
ment); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972) (fourteenth amendment); Freeman
v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974) (eighth amendment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (eighth amendment); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1973)
(eighth amendment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1970) (eighth amendment); Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.
1965) (eighth amendment).
21. 429 U.S. at 106. The Court's emphasis that the inadvertent failure to provide medical
care is inactionable seemingly excludes negligent conduct. However, the application of
"deliberate indifference" sometimes includes conduct best characterized as negligent. See
notes 118-120 and accompanying text infra.
22. The evolving standards of decency concept inherent in the eighth amendment implies
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ent in the eighth amendment.Y Applying this standard, however,
creates considerable problems.24
In assessing the facts presented by the prisoner-plaintiff, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the complaint was predicated on a
failure to provide additional diagnostic techniques, such as X-ray,
and therefore alleged only a claim of medical malpractice against
the prison doctor. 5 The Court remanded for consideration of the
claim against other non-medical prison officials.2" Justice Stevens
dissented, 27 believing that the complaint showed indifference by the
failure to treat the injury promptly and by the conduct of the prison
staff in placing him in solitary. He further read the pro se25 com-
plaint as one which challenged the entire prison medical system and
not as a claim of individual medical malpractice. More importantly,
Justice Stevens objected to the standard applied by the Court, be-
lieving that a subjective motivation standard for determining
whether the punishment was cruel and unusual was erroneous. He
felt the violation of the constitutional standard must turn on the
character of the punishment" and not the motivation behind its
infliction. While this may well be appropriate in determining the
extent of the remedy required, he reasoned, it is not relevant to the
standard for determining a constitutional violation.30
While Estelle recognized that the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is a sufficient constitutional
a flexible and adaptable concept. It therefore follows that the standard for assessing these
claims should be one which is capable of expansion and.change.
23. 429 U.S. at 106.
24. See notes 106-121 and accompanying text infra.
25. 429 U.S. at 107.
26. On remand, however, it was subsequently determined by the court of appeals that no
claim was stated against the director and warden since there was no evidence to indicate that
they interfered with plaintiff's treatment or manifested deliberate indifference to his needs.
Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. (1977).
27. 429 U.S. 97, 108 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. A complaint drafted by a prisoner on his own behalf without assistance of counsel is
designated as pro se complaint. Regardless of how inartfully pleaded, it is held to less strin-
gent standards and should be dismissed only if it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no facts to support his claim. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). Justice Stevens felt that the complaint in Estelle should be construed
as one attacking the constitutionality of the entire prison medical system. 429 U.S. at 110
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. This approach is similar to the "shocks the conscience" standard which is discussed
at text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
30. 429 U.S. at 116-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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basis for section 1983 prisoner suits pertaining to medical treat-
ment, and reiterated the frequently recurring concern that medical
malpractice should not be a constitutional tort, the Court failed to
clearly define the meaning and application of the "deliberate indif-
ference" standard. Consequently, in applying this standard to the
facts presented in Estelle, the Court concluded that the action av-
erred only medical malpractice without offering any guidance as to
how it reached this conclusion.
II. THE APPLICATION OF "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE"
A. Individual Claims Alleging Inadequate Medical Treatment
When a prisoner seeking money damages' alleges that inadequate
medical treatment has been given, it is axiomatic that, in order to
recover, more must be alleged than medical malpractice or differ-
ence of medical opinion. Most complaints alleging inadequate medi-
cal treatment fail to survive the defendant's motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment.32 Once it is established that some
medical treatment was given, courts are unwilling to second guess
medical judgments and therefore dismiss the action. 33 The standard
for assessing these claims is often subjective, 3 and the disposition
of the claim depends on the facts of the complaint and the personal
reaction of the court assessing them. It is this manifestation of delib-
erate or callous indifference which comprises the exceptional cir-
cumstances which justify federal court intervention in the adminis-
tration of a state prison.5
31. In cases involving individual claims of inadequate medical treatment, injunctive relief
is usually ineffective. Therefore, monetary relief is the most frequently sought remedy. See
also note 2 supra.
32. This is true although pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards of plead-
ing. See note 28 supra.
33. See, e.g., Fore v. Godwin, 407 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1976) (medical records
indicated treatment was given; questions of medical judgment are not subject to judicial
review). The fact of medical treatment is apparently more important than the quality of the
treatment.
34. Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 92, 122 (1977).
35. See cases cited in note 14 supra. See also Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.
1972) (federal court intervention justified where threat to physical health is presented);
Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1970) (courts may
intervene when necessary to protect constitutional rights); Mayfield v. Craven, 299 F. Supp.
1111 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1969) (complaint actionable which alleges
Vol. 17: 3-4
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1. Individual Claims for Inadequate Medical Treatment Found
Actionable
Four cases readily illustrate the approach of the courts when con-
fronted with allegations that inadequate medical treatment has re-
sulted in the deliberate infliction of pain. In Runnels v. Rosendale31
the plaintiff alleged that he was given a hemorrhoidectomy without
his consent and was denied analgesics for pain after the operation.
The district court dismissed the complaint as one alleging merely a
difference in opinion as to the mode of treatment which is not a
constitutional violation. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that the withholding of pain killers constituted the deliberate
infliction of pain.37
The plaintiff in Robinson v. Jordan3 claimed that a doctor misdi-
agnosed severe rectal pains as hemorrhoids, refused his request for
an X-ray, and insulted him with a racial slur. Three months later
the condition was diagnosed as advanced rectal cancer and a colos-
tomy was performed. Plaintiff, claimed that he plead guilty to a
murder charge simply to get out of that particular jail so he could
receive treatment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court
which had dismissed the complaint without a hearing and held that
an evidentiary hearing was required to assess the sufficiency of the
claim .3
A similar situation was presented in Williams v. Vincent, 10 one of
the cases which the Estelle court relied upon in adopting the
"deliberate indifference" standard.." In Williams the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's determination that no claim of inade-
quate medical treatment was stated. Plaintiff, who had a portion of
his ear cut off in an altercation with a fellow inmate, brought suit
against prison doctors who merely stitched the remaining stump of
failure to provide medical care for acute physical condition which results in tangible residual
injury).
36. 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
37. Id. at 736.
38. 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 795. The district court dismissed the pro se complaint without a hearing, and
concluded that assuming proof of all the facts alleged, plaintiff would be entitled to no relief.
The court of appeals felt that the complaint should not be narrowly viewed as negligence or
medical malpractice in light of the policy to construe civil rights pro se complaints liberally.
Id. at 794.
40. 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
41. See 429 U.S. at 106 n.14. See also note 16 supra.
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his ear, threw away the severed portion in his presence, and told him
that he did not need it anymore. Immediately thereafter he was
placed in solitary confinement for twenty two days without receiv-
ing any medication, and he later required six plastic surgery opera-
tions. Although the defendant argued that the complaint stated a
mere difference of opinion over medical judgment and did not reach
constitutional proportions," the court of appeals found that it was
not an exercise of professional judgment but deliberate indifference
which caused the prison medical officials to tell the plaintiff that
he did not need his ear and to throw it away in front of him, rather
than attempting to re-attach the severed portion. The possibility
that it was deliberate indifference which caused the prison medical
officials to choose an easier, less effective treatment could not be
foreclosed." This, the court felt, was distinguishable from the situa-
tion presented in United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis,44 where
the plaintiff claimed that the tranquilizers given him in liquid form
were not as effective as those given in tablet form. In Hyde, unlike
Williams, where there was no manifestation of deliberate indiffer-
ence, the Second Circuit felt that mere medical malpractice was
being alleged and therefore dismissed the complaint.
In Freeman v. Lockhart,45 the plaintiff contended that his vision
was permanently impaired when he was confined with a man known
to have tuberculosis. The disease settled in his eyes and constituted
a vision hazard for which surgery was advised. However, the surgery
was denied and instead plaintiff was given eye drops. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that this
conduct could very well constitute deliberate indifference since it
was through the prison's negligent conditions of confinement that
the plaintiff initially contracted the illness, and it was through their
further failure to arrange for special treatment that the plaintiff's
vision was impaired." As a result, plaintiff's claim was found to be
actionable.
42. 508 F.2d at 544.
43. Id.
44. 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970).
45. 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 1017-18.
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2. Individual Claims for Inadequate Medical Treatment FoundInactionable
Courtney v. Adams47 affirmed a district court's dismissal of a
claim which was held to express a mere disagreement as to medical
treatment . 8 The plaintiff, who suffered from a growth next to his
heart, was scheduled for a major operation, but his request for addi-
tional painkillers was denied. 9 A request for injunctive relief was
also denied in Massey v. Hutto"O where plaintiff claimed that he was
suffering from a disabled right hand, that his assignment to the
garden squad aggravated his skin cancer, and that he was made to
run although he suffered poor balance as a result of brain surgery.
The medical records revealed the following facts: that he had seen
the prison medical authorities on twenty four occasions; his hand
had been X-rayed and found fit; he received pain medication for his
hand, and he was reclassified as a medical disability and removed
from the garden squad. On the basis of these medical records, the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff was
not a victim of deliberate indifference and dismissed the com-
plaint. 51
47. 528 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir. 1976).
48. Id. at 1057.
49. This is factually similar to United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, discussed at text
accompanying note 44 supra.
50. 545 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1976) (decided after Estelle). But see Cotton v. Hutto, 540 F.2d
412 (8th Cir. 1976), where plaintiff sought equitable relief, including a request to order an
operation and excusal from field work. Although the district court dismissed on its own
motion, concluding that the failure to perform the operation was a difference of opinion over
medical judgment, the court of appeals remanded for further proceedings stating that the
facts alleged, if proven, could show deliberate indifference. Id. at 415.
51. 545 F.2d at 46. This situation may be contrasted with Derrickson v. Keve, 390 F.
Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1975), which also involved a request for an advance date of operation. The
district court in Derrickson disagreed with the defendant's contention that the request for the
advance date of an operation on the prisoner's sinus cavity expressed a mere difference of
opinion since one overwhelming fact was present-the plaintiff was serving a life sentence
and could not elect to have the operation performed when he was released. Unless the defen-
dants acted and granted him surgery, the surgery would be impossible and its denial would
constitute the deliberate infliction of pain.
See also Walnorch v. McMonagle, 412 F. Supp. 270, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (postponement of
a non critical operation is not the equivalent of grossly inadequate medical care).
A district court dismissal of a claim was reversed and remanded in West v. Keve, 571 F.2d
158 (3d Cir. 1978), where a state prisoner who was serving a life sentence had varicose vein
surgery postponed for seventeen months, during which time he allegedly suffered great pain.
The court stated that constitutional standards would be violated if deliberate indifference
caused an easier and less effective treatment to be used. The fact the prisoner was serving a
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In Bass v. Sullivan,"2 a post-Estelle case, the plaintiff suffered
frostbite injuries during a prison escape and sought damages for the
amputation of his legs at the knees. After the amputation, the plain-
tiff received drugs for pain and was cared for by three nurses. The
treatment pursued was generally along standard lines of treatment
in similar situations. Although Estelle indicated that the proper
standard in determining a constitutional violation is deliberate in-
difference, the district court in Bass apparently used the "shocks
the conscience" standard in assessing the complaint. On review, the
court of appeals noted that while the deliberate indifference stan-
dard is preferable, "shocks the conscience" may also be used. The
court felt that under any test the same result, dismissal, would
follow.53 Bass raises several interesting points concerning the appli-
cation of the "deliberate indifference" standard. The district court
did not apply the "callous (deliberate) indifference" standard54 but
the "shocks the conscience" standard.5 It is uncertain whether the
decision in Bass stands for the proposition that "shocks the
conscience" is a permissible alternative to "deliberate indifference"
or whether the two tests are legally equivalent. Either one of these
interpretations may be viable in light of the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in Bass. However, if the two tests are read as being
equivalent, an inconsistency arises, because the "deliberate indif-
ference" standard involves intent, while "shocks the conscience"
does not.
life sentence was such an exceptional circumstance as to cause postponement of the surgery
to be deliberate indifference.
. See also Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (suit brought
by arrested individual against village stated cause of action where plaintiff was paralyzed as
a result of failure to allow medical treatment for broken neck while incarcerated).
52. 550 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1978).
53. Id. at 233. See also two cases where deliberate indifference was not shown: Smart v.
Villar, 545 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1976) (no deliberate indifference shown where the record
documented a series of sick calls, examinations, diagnosis, and prescription of medication);
Mosby v. O'Brien, 414 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (no constitutional violation stated by
prisoner who complained he received only "darvon and promises" for kidney problem).
54. The Fifth Circuit test of "callous indifference" which was prolulgated in Newman v.
Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975), was among the
cases deemed to be equivalent to "deliberate indifference" in Estelle. See note 16 supra
55. The "shocks the conscience" standard was applied by Newman at the district court
level. The "shocks the conscience" standard is derived from Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1971). Two other cases which the Estelle court held to be compatible with deliberate
indifference, Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); and Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d
625 (9th Cir. 1970), employed a standard which was based on Novak. See note 16 supra.
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The standards of Estelle were specifically mentioned and applied
in Wester v. Jones. 16 Plaintiff first complained of an injury to his left
eye during a physical examination conducted on his initial entry
into prison, and during a three month period he made several addi-
tional complaints concerning pain and loss of vision in his eye. A
specialist later found a detached retina, and although he was
treated for this condition, his full sight was never restored. Plain-
tiff contended that the prison doctor cursorily examined him after
the initial complaint and never, re-examined him. The Fourth Cir-
cuit applied the -standards of Estelle and found no constitutional
violation. Even if the doctor were negligent in examining plaintiff
and in making an incorrect diagnosis, the court felt that his failure
to exercise sound professional judgment would not constitute de-
liberate indifference to serious medical needs. 57 The dissent, con-
cluding that the "deliberate indifference" standard was satisfied,
read the complaint as stating a denial of medical treatment, thus
avoiding a subjective evaluation of the quality of care given, and
not as a complaint of inadequate medical treatment with possible
malpractice ramifications. 8
The standards promulgated in Estelle were the subject of further
elaboration in Laaman v. Helgemoe.59 There the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hampshire stated that a section
1983 action requires callous (deliberate) indifference to medical
needs which are serious and, additionally, considerable harm result-
ing from the failure to treat them. The importance of this decision
lies in the court's definition of a serious medical need as one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one
that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for
treatment. 0
B. Individual Claims Alleging the Denial of Medical Care
Many complaints which allege a denial of medical care are, in
reality, concerned with situations in which some medical care is
provided but it is alleged to be inadequate. When this is the case,
the allegation must rise above the level of medical malpractice.6 1 A
56. 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 1286.
58. 554 F.2d 1285, 1287 (Winters, J., dissenting).
59. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
60. Id. at 311.
61. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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constitutional violation is stated by the total denial of medical care
when there is an intent to harm the inmate, or where the injury is
so severe and obvious that medical treatment is clearly required.2
Typically, cases alleging denial of medical care are directed toward
prison guards and other prison personnel who deny the prisoner
access to medical care, rather than the prison medical staff. How-
ever, in some cases, complaints are directed against medical person-
nel on the ground that the medical treatment, as given, is so mini-
mal and inadequate as to constitute a total denial of medical care.
On the other hand, a complaint against prison authorities which
does not allege personal involvement in the decision to deny medical
treatment or does not allege severe and obvious injuries is properly
dismissed . 3
No constitutional violation was found in Hampton v. Holmesburg
Prison Officials,4 where the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's award of damages. Plaintiff had been assaulted and suffered
injuries to his jaw, head, face, and right hand. Two days after the
incident he asked for medical attention and submitted sick call slips
on the following day. Five days later he saw a prison nurse; seven
days after his request he saw a prison doctor, and then he was taken
to a Philadelphia hospital for out-patient treatment. Although the
plaintiff claimed a denial of medical treatment, once it was estab-
lished that he had been given access to medical treatment within a
reasonable time, the type of treatment he then received was not
questioned. The court noted that the constitutional standard was
not satisfied since the record failed to support the charge that the
guards deliberately or intentionally prevented plaintiff from receiv-
ing medical treatment, nor was it shown they prevented his sick
call slips from proceeding through established channels.
A jury verdict in favor of the prisoner-plaintiff was set aside in
McCracken v. Jones,5 where the warden and director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections successfully argued on appeal that it was error
62. See, e.g., Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Maynard, 437 F.
Supp. 47 (D. Kan. 1977); Roach v. Kligman, 412 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (need intent
to harm or failure to treat severe and obvious injuries); Bartling v. Ciccone, 376 F. Supp. 200
(W.D. Mo. 1974).
63. Mathis v. Pratt, 375 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (complaint dismissed which did not
allege personal involvement). See also Parrilla v. Cuyler, 447 F. Supp. 363, 367 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (principles of respondeat superior are inapplicable).
64. 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).
65. 562 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1977).
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to deny their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Plaintiff injured his back and had been examined by prison doctors
who prescribed exercises that he refused to follow. The plaintiff
consulted his private physician who later performed surgery." The
Tenth Circuit held that the prison supervisory personnel were enti-
tled to rely on the diagnosis given by the prison medical authorities
who examined plaintiff." If the prisoner plaintiff had brought suit
against the prison medical officials questioning their course of treat-
ment and their refusal to recommend the surgery, the complaint
would have been treated as one which alleged a difference of opinion
and would therefore have been promptly dismissed."
A district court's dismissal of a claim was held erroneous in
Westlake v. Lucas" where a county jail inmate alleged that he was
denied a special diet and ulcer medication. Six days after his incar-
ceration he started to 'vomit blood and was told he could receive no
medical treatment for two days. The Sixth Circuit noted that a
section 1983 claim was stated, finding the denial of an obvious need
for medication and the needless suffering of pain where relief was
readily available. 0
C. Individual Claims Alleging Denial of Prescribed Medical
Treatment
Although it is often difficult to show deliberate indifference in
cases involving inadequate medical treatment, there is little doubt
that a refusal to follow a prescribed course of medical treatment is
66. Failure to allow medical treatment at facilities outside a prison is not actionable. See
Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1976).
67. 562 F.2d at 24.
68. A refusal to allow an inmate who is in solitary confinement access to medical care may
be actionable depending on the nature, extent, seriousness of the injury, the need for medical
treatment, and the defendant's conduct. In Mathis v. DiGiacinto, 430 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa.
1977), the plaintiff alleged that repeated requests for skin medication he was receiving prior
to solitary were denied. The court declined to rule as a matter of law that no constitutional
deprivations had taken place.
See also Fitzke v. Shappel, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972) (nine hour delay in receiving
medical attention after arrest and incarceration where prisoner limped and complained of
pain and numbness in leg actionable). But see Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1977)
(no callous or shocking disregard where inmates were forced to remain in cells for two hours
without showers or other medical treatment after inmate in adjoining cell was tear-gassed.
69. 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. Accord, Scharfenberger v. Wingo, 542 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 1976); Williams v.
Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
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actionable. The leading case involving interference with a pre-
scribed course of medical treatment is Martinez v. Mancusi.7 In this
action against the warden, prison doctor, and guards, the plaintiff',
who suffered from infantile paralysis, received an operation at a
civilian hospital and was instructed to move his legs as little as
possible after the operation. The prison guards who returned him to
the hospital handcuffed him, forced him to walk, and placed him
in a cell without facilities to care for him and denied him his pre-
scribed medication. The Second Circuit reversed the district court
and held that the conduct constituted deliberate indifference to
explicit medical instructions resulting in severe and obvious inju-
ries. 72
A county jail inmate successfully alleged a constitutional viola-
tion in Westlake v. Lucas.73 The allegations of the complaint indi-
cated that he informed admitting personnel that he suffered from
an ulcer and his request for a special diet and medication was ig-
nored. His complaints of stomach pain went unheeded; and when
he began to vomit blood he was given only antacid. Although the
district court dismissed the action since it could find no tangible
residual injury, 74 the Sixth Circuit noted that a prisoner who
alleges he is allowed to suffer pain when relief is readily available
states a cause of action. In light of this judicial, pronouncement, it
is surprising that the court required a "tangible residual injury" as
a condition for recovery. 75 The amount of pain and suffering in-
volved where relief is readily available should constitute an action-
able claim, even if no residual injury is involved. Although the re-
quirement of a residual injury eliminates frivolous claims, it seems
impermissible to interpret the eighth amendment as prohibiting
71. 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
72. Id. at 924-25.
73. 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976).
74. This concept is derived from Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 997 (1967). There the court found that federal intervention could be justified only
by the showing of an acute physical condition, the urgent need for medical care, the failure
or refusal to provide it, and tangible residual injury. Id. at 421 n.3. The Stiltner court held
that the plaintiff must show more than a disagreement with the kind and quality of medical
treatment. Id.
75. 537 F.2d at 860. But see Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964) (claim that
special diet was discontinued is insufficient in absence of allegation of bodily injury); Carlisle
v. Scott, 357 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. I1. 1973) (failure to provide bland diet as ordered is not




the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment only if a tangible
residual injury exists;
A complaint which alleged denial of medicine needed to control
epileptic seizures survived a motion to dismiss in Mitchell v. Ches-
ter County Farms Prison.7" Upon his transfer to Chester County,
plaintiff informed a sergeant and medical officer of his condition.
Although they said medication would be sent, it was not provided
until three days later despite the constant requests of the prisoner.
After the plaintiff suffered an epileptic seizure which resulted in a
head injury requiring hospital attention, medication was provided.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania felt that the arbitrary and capricious behavior of the prison
officials satisfied the requirements of Estelle."
Arbitrary and capricious conduct by the prison staff is also illus-
trated in the case of Tolbert v. Eyman" where a diabetic whose
disease affected his eyes received treatment which substantially
improved his vision. As a result of a diminution in his medical
treatment after his incarceration, he received insulin and blood
pressure medication only once a day. The doctors were skeptical of
the effectiveness of the medication but reluctantly informed him he
could have the medication if he paid for it. However, the medication
was returned for security reasons when sent by his wife and when
sent directly by the druggist. 9
Prison officials required all medication to be taken in crushed or
liquid form to prevent narcotics addicts from hoarding medication
in Sawyer v. Sigler. 8 Plaintiff, who suffered from emphysema, was
required to take medication three times daily. However, this caused
nausea when taken in crushed form, and although the doctor specifi-
cally ordered that the medication not be taken in this form, the
prison administrative officials overruled him. The court concluded
76. 426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa 1976).
77. See also Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972) (improper to dismiss claim
alleging warden knew of plaintiff's heart trouble and disability classification and ordered him
to field work which resulted in heart attack).
78. 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970).
79. Id. at 626. "The gravamen of his claim is not that he was erroneously diagnosed by
the prison doctor, but that the warden refused to allow him authorized medicine that he
needed to prevent serious harm to his health." Id. But see Henderson v. Secretary of Correc-
tions, 518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1975) (no claim was stated by failure to fill prescription for
corrective shoes).
80. 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970).
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that requiring the plaintiff to take his medication in the crushed
form in the absence of a showing that he had a tendency to abuse
drugs was sufficiently unusual, exceptional and arbitrary as to con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.8
D. Allegations that Medical Treatment Facilities and Systems Are
Inadequate
The majority of cases brought since Estelle focus on the adequacy
of the entire medical treatment facilities. Although isolated instan-
ces alleging inadequate medical treatment are insufficient to state
a constitutional violation, such incidents, taken cumulatively, may
indicate the inadequacy of the entire system.82 Where the constitu-
tionality of the medical facilities is being litigated, there is no dan-
ger of creating the constitutional tort of medical malpractice. The
prisoner's lack of access to alternative systems of medical care re-
quires that access to adequate medical treatment be furnished by
the prison. Consequently, the courts have taken a more active ap-
proach, and in concentrating on remedying future violations rather
than past wrongs, have imposed affirmative duties on prison person-
nel.83
Actions involving the adequacy of the medical system usually
request equitable relief rather than monetary damages. The avail-
able remedies can include a requirement that the institution pre-
pare long-range plans as well as specific judicial mandates which
dictate to the prison the number of personnel that must be hired
and the physical improvements that must be made.84
81. Id. at 694.
82. Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974).
83. See discussion in text accompanying notes 98-99 infra.
84. Barnes v. Government of Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976), is typical of
the minimum standards courts may specifically delineate. Minimum standards were held to
consist of the following: (1) the standard for medical, dental, and psychiatric care was re-
quired to be comparable with that offered to the general public; (2) a medical doctor with
regular hours known to the inmates and always available on call; (3) provisions for 24-hour
emergency medical treatment; (4) intake physicals; (5) prescription of drugs under strict
supervision by trained medical personnel; (6) complete and accurate medical records; (7)
provision for special tests and the equipment needed to conduct them, to be accomplished
by medical furloughs, purchased services, or transfer to appropriate facilities; (8) part-time
dentist oncall for curative and preventive treatment; (9) psychiatrist to be provided one day
per week within sixty days; (10) psychiatric aide permanently on staff; (11) intake medical
status exam and transfer to an appropriate facility if needed, and (12) establishment of an
alcohol and drug rehabilitation program. Id. at 1234-35.
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Typically, complaints pertaining to the medical treatment sys-
tem allege inadequate diagnostic procedure,85 lack of medical per-
sonnel,8 burdensome administrative procedures which result in
denial of access to medical care,87 and inadequate facilities for treat-
ment.8 8 It is difficult to state, as a conclusion, general standards
since the cases involved present a wide range of factual situations;
in some cases the presence or absence of any one of these factors can
be determinative of the constitutionality of the entire medical treat-
ment system.
If a claim for monetary damages is sought, the courts may refuse
to grant it, and instead provide equitable relief as was done in Hines
v. Anderson." There the court entered an order and consent decree
which stated that the provisions of the Minnesota Patient's Bill of'
Rights9 would apply to medical treatment given in state prison.
Additionally, the parties agreed to improve intake physical exami-
nations, the number of staff members and methods for sick call
procedures. In instances where the courts do not feel qualified to
assess the medical facilities, they have not hesitated to seek addi-
tional advice from outside doctors or medical associations.92
85. This includes lack of routine medical procedures; lack of laboratory testing and slow
follow-up procedure. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Mass. 1977) (com-
plete physicals and routine innoculations required by the court).
86. The number of doctors and medical staff members available and the hours which they
are available is subject to judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206
(5th Cir. 1977) (staff consisting almost entirely of inmates with minimal education and
inadequate supervision found to violate constitutional standards).
87. Procedures for going on sick call are particularly important. See, e.g., Todaro v. Ward,
565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977) (arbitrary sick call procedures resulted in delay in obtaining
medical treatment and as a result, inmates suffered unnecessary pain).
88. Lack of clinic or hospital facilities may not be used to justify inadequate medical
treatment. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (court ordered new
hospital to be built).
89. See Coxson v. Godwin, 405 F. Supp. 1099,1102 (W.D. Va. 1975) (there is no consensus
as to the precise amount of medical treatment that is necessary).
90. 439 F. Supp. 12 (D. Minn. 1977).
91. MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (1974). The Patient's Bill of Rights includes, but is not limited
to, the following requirements: (1) the right to considerate and respectful care; (2) the right
to complete and current information regarding diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis; (3) the
right to privacy and individuality; (4) the right to respectfulness and privacy; (5) the right
to respect the facility to reasonably respond to the patients' requests, and () the right to
reasonable continuity of care. Id.
92. In Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the court asked a local
medical association to designate a team of qualified doctors to survey the sufficiency of the
medical facilities and report the findings to the court.
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Although the problems inherent in a court evaluation of the ade-
quacy of a prison medical system are obvious, courts, nevertheless,
continue to seek effective standards by which to assess them. In
Laaman v. Helgemoe,13 the United States District Court for the
District-of New Hampshire declared that standard to be "whether
or not defendants' facilities, acts or omissions, overall, endanger the
health of the prison community in such a manner as to evince a
deliberate and calloused disregard of the serious medical needs of
plaintiffs." 4 The court further stated that the medical unit must be
looked at as a whole "because it is the end result, the total health
care made available to and received by the plaintiff class which is
subject to constitutional scrutiny."95 The court wisely observed that
those courts which have ordered additional medical staff did not
rely on ratios of staff to inmates, but instead focused on the underly-
ing concept that inmates are entitled to a qualified medical care at
all times.96 Although the plaintiffs in that particular case had estab-
lished that serious medical problems had not been treated and could
result in permanent damage if left untreated, the court felt that the
fact that less serious medical complaints were routinely ignored was
more important. 7 The medical staff, equipment, and facilities were
found to be so insufficient as to create, in the words of the court, a
"time bomb" in terms of the inmates' health and well-being."
An affirmative duty is imposed on prison personnel to provide an
adequate medical treatment system and to conduct evaluations and
respond to the results. This is not limited to the condition of the
physical facilities, but also includes the procedures established for
sick call. Where arbitrary sick call procedures exist or where sick
call procedures are misadministered in such a way that denial of
access becomes willful, a constitutional violation is stated. Inaction
on the part of prison officials may therefore result in federal court
intervention; and while single instances of medical care denied or
delayed may not state a claim, repeated examples may indicate
deliberate indifference to the needs of prisoners.
93. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
94. Id. at 315.
95. Id.
: 96. Id. at. 312.
97. This may be contrasted with approach of the Westlake court, discussed in notes 73-
75 and accompanying text supra.
98. 437 F. Supp. at 312.
99. Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974). Constitutional standards may also
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Not all medical systems complained of have been found to be
constitutionally infirm. Lack of thorough intake exams for pretrial
detainees does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.""' A
medical staff consisting of a medical doctor and nurses who pro-
vided emergency care and semi-weekly sick call has been found
adequate.'"' An allegation that medical care was denied on particu-
lar occasions is not sufficient to show deliberate indifference.,02 Ade-
quate medical services may be provided by two medical technicians
who visit a cell block three times each day.'0 It is obvious that there
is no consensus as to the precise amount of medical care that must
be available, or the number of persons who provide it." 4 The fact
that a doctor assigned to a unit will not examine inmates after
certain hours, the fact there is no nurse, or that a prisoner must wait
before obtaining treatment is not sufficient to establish deliberate
indifference.'05 If a prison maintains a sick call available to all in-
mates and staffed by some medically trained personnel with a doc-
tor furnished periodically, this in itself may be sufficient to satisfy
constitutional standards.' 6
be violated when the care given generally is so inadequate that it causes unwarranted suffer-
ing, or by the failure to segregate prisoners with contagious or communicable diseases.
Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977); Cruz v. Ward, 558 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Todaro, female prisoners alleged denial of access to medical care by arbitrary procedures
and misadministration. The nurse responsible for initial screening and dispensing medicine
spent only 15-20 seconds with each patient. A two week or two month delay in seeing a
physician meant inmates suffered unnecessary pain. Patients in the sick wing were kept in
rooms with a solid locked door making it impossible to hear cries for help. Poor record keep-
ing caused substantial delays in medically ordered follow-up appointments, and medical
orders were not properly followed. Id. at 50-53.
There is also a constitutional right to be confined in an environment which does not
threaten mental or physical well-being. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977).
In cases where the court has ordered injunctive relief and the hiring of additional personnel,
this has been affirmed on appeal as being valid and not barred by the eleventh amendment.
See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
100. Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
101. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
102. Cotton v. Hutto, 540 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1976) (six inmates alleged denial of medical
care on particular occasions).
103. Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975).
104. Coxson v. Godwin, 405 F. Supp. 1009, 1101 (W.D. Va. 1975).
105. Id.
106. Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Sup. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976). See also Owens-El v. Robinson,
442 F. Supp. 1368, 1385, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (no claim stated by allegation that no nurses
or physicians were available after midnight but absence of nurses trained in psychiatric care
created problems which must be remedied).
Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L.
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III. THE MEANING OF "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE"
In those situations where an individual claim for inadequate med-
ical treatment was held actionable, the injury or illness complained
of could be observed by a layman or judge without the need to resort
to medical experts, and the pain which was suffered could be easily
understood. Additionally, in each case there was the presence of a
factor making the conduct of the medical personnel reprehensi-
ble-performing the hemorrhoidectomy without consent in
Runnels,"°7 the insulting racial slur in Robinson,""' the throwing
away of plaintiffs ear and being told he did not need it in
Williams,0 1 and the contracting of tuberculosis as a result of con-
finement with a prisoner known to have the disease in Freeman. ""0
Although these factors may satisfy the intent requirement of
"deliberate indifference," "shocking the conscience" appears to be
a better description of the courts' application of the constitutional
standard.
The concept underlying the "deliberate indifference" standard is
that deliberate or intentional failure to treat serious medical needs
is a necessary requirement in order to avoid the creation of a consti-
tutional tort of medical malpractice. However, the difficulty lies in
determining what behavior on the part of the prison staff' is
"deliberate" or "callous.""' The courts' reliance on medical records
as a tool to be used in determining whether deliberate indifference
is established"' creates a presumption that the medical system was
not deliberately indifferent. Thus, insofar as prisoners are con-
cerned, it is not the quality of the treatment but the fact of treat-
ment which satisfies the eighth amendment standard. Where recov-
REv. 387, 466-72 (1977) proposes standards for prison medical treatment systems. The stan-
dards recommend that each institution should have an adequate plan to insure emergency
medical treatment; to permit transfer of those who cannot be adequately treated at the
correctional institution; to prevent a correctional official from denying or interfering with
medical treatment; that upon request a prisoner will be seen by a licensed health care
provider within 24 hours; that prisoners need not waive a right or privilege in order to secure
medical treatment. These standards also advocate periodic medical exams, intake exams for
communicable diseases or emergency care, a thorough medical exam within 48 hours of
admission, and thorough medical exams periodically and prior to release. Id.
107. 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
108. 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
109. 508 F.2d 541-(2d Cir. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
110. 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
111. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 33 supra.
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ery has been allowed for individual allegations of inadequate medi-
cal treatment, there has been present an additional factor, or excep-
tional circumstance, upon which the courts base their finding of
deliberate indifference.
The circumstance in Runnels"3 which appears to have constituted
the deliberate indifference is the performance of the operation with-
out consent. Absent this factor, the complaint would more closely
resemble United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, " which was held
inactionable since the plaintiff merely criticized the type of pain
medication received. If the doctor in Vincent"5 had not told plaintiff
that he did not need his ear, or if he had not thrown it away in front
of the plaintiff, the failure to reattach the severed portion would not
have been actionable since the feasibility of doing so would be a
question of medical judgment. The refusal of the request for an X-
ray in Robinson"' would factually resemble Estelle, and therefore
be inactionable, if unaccompanied by the racial slur. The denial of
surgery and the subsequent vision impairment in Freeman"7 may be
constrasted with Wester"' where a detached retina resulting in vi-
sion loss was held to be inactionable. Factually, the most significant
difference is that in Freeman the disability was contracted while in
prison, while in Webster it was pre-existing.
The reason for different results in factually similar cases must
therefore turn on subjective judgments. Although courts claim to
assess complaints by the standard of "deliberate indifference," they
are actually applying a "shocks the conscience" standard. While
"deliberate indifference" would exclude on its face "negligent" con-
duct, some of the conduct which the courts find to be deliberately
indifferent is actually negligent conduct."' If courts are in reality
applying a "shocks the conscience" standard in these cases then it
should be labelled as such instead of resorting to the intent oriented
113. See note 107 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
115. See text accomanying notes 40-44 supra.
116. See note 108 supra.
117. See note 110 supra.
118. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
119. Williams v Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974), seemingly approaches negligent
conduct. In Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974), the prison appeared to be
negligent in confining the plaintiff with another prisoner known to have tuberculosis. The
postpoing or denial of surgery in Derrickson and West, discussed at note 51 supra, also
appears to be essentially negligent conduct.
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terminology of "deliberate indifference." Bass2 ' is illustrative of the
confusion of the courts as to the meaning of the standard. In that
case, the two standards were read as being similar. Since the re-
quirement of considerable harm is also present in the "shocks the
conscience" standard, "shocks the conscience" not only better rer-
lects what the courts are actually doing, but also safeguards against
frivolous claims and the establishment of the constitutional tort of
malpractice in the arena of individual prisoner medical complaints.
Since claims alleging denial of medical care focus on questions of
access and not the adequacy of care received, the courts have en-
countered fewer barriers to the recognition of an actionable claim.
However, this is due to the fact that the most likely defendant in
these situations is not a member of the prison medical staff, but a
guard or other administrative official. Courts are not questioning
medical judgments but are looking to the actions of non medical
personnel. In these circumstances, the danger of the creation of a
constitutional tort is nonexistent, and, therefore, there seems to be
little need to utilize the "deliberate indifference" standard.,2
Where a denial of prescribed medical treatment is alleged, delib-
erate indifference is shown if medical treatment was in fact ordered
and intentionally, arbitrarily, or capriciously denied. 2 Behavior
that is arbitrary and capricious is difficult to conceptualize as delib-
erately indifferent, and, therefore, is more appropriately shocking to
the conscience. Again, the courts are stretching the meaning of
"deliberate indifference" to include conduct that is an appropriate
target for section 1983 relief, but does not fit within the supposed
intent requirements of the "deliberate indifference" standard.
120. See discussion in notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
121. Prison inmates are entitled to medical treatment when a physician or other health
care provider exercising reasonable skill, determines with reasonable medical certainty that
the symptoms show a serious disease or injury which could be cured or alleviated by medical
treatment, and that the harm to the prisoner would be substantial. See text accompanying
notes 59-60 supra. Once the test of medical necessity is met and the decision that medical
treatment is necessary has been made, the prison staff may not interfere with or deny medical
treatment. Actual knowledge or personal participation in the decision to deny medical care
is required. In the absence of an intentional denial, the seriousness and extent of the injury
may place upon the defendant a duty to provide medical care, although this may be a difficult
burden to meet under the "deliberate indifference" standard.




As illustrated by the increasing number of complaints directed to
the inadequacy of entire prison medical facilities, there is a growing
judicial awareness of the inadequacy of prison medical systems and
a search by the courts to define minimum constitutional standards.
The roots of the "deliberate indifference" standard as promulgated
in Estelle, were designed to prevent the establishment of a constitu-
tional tort of medical malpractice. The application of this standard,
however, has been stretched to include all claims pertaining to pris-
oner medical needs rather than those involving individual claims of
inadequate medical treatment. Given the wide variety of prisoner
medical needs, as reflected in the typical areas of prisoner com-
plaints, it is doubtful that a single standard is either adequate or
appropriate.
The "deliberate indifference" standard is cumbersome in redress-
ing individual claims of inadequate medical treatment. While it is
conceded that some standard is needed to preclude the constitu-
tional claim of medical malpractice, it is suggested that "shocks the
conscience," rather than "deliberate indifference," is more appro-
priate. "Deliberate indifference" does not sufficiently focus on the
concept of evolving standards of decency which is inherent in the
eighth amendment. Although the language of the standard seem-
ingly excludes negligent conduct, the determining factor in many
cases appears to be negligent conduct under exceptional circum-
stances. Thus, the more liberal courts define "deliberate" as includ-
ing negligent actions.ss However, some courts may decline to use
that broad interpretation and deny relief to valid claims simply be-
cause the intent requirement has not been met.
"Deliberate indifference" is but one component of behavior which
is shocking to the conscience. Arbitrary, capricious, outrageous, ex-
ceptional or unusual behavior are other possible components. Cases
which purport to apply "deliberate indifference" nevertheless in-
clude these other factors.' 2' Although the proper result may some-
times be reached utilizing "deliberate indifference," the confusion
123. See notes 111-119 and accompanying text surpa.
124. See, e.g., the discussion of the arbitrary and capricious requirement at text accompa-
nying notes 76-79 supra; the discussion of unusual and exceptional circumstances at text
accompanying notes 80-81 supra, and the discussion of "deliberate indifference" at text
accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
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and theoretical perplexities surrounding its application could easily
be avoided by referring to the standard that is actually being ap-
plied-"shocks the conscience."
In the case of complaints pertaining to the adequacy of medical
facilities, a broader standard is required. Reasonable and adequate
care, and not some intent-oriented standard would be the proper
approach to be considered in developing minimum constitutional
requirements for overall prison medical treatment systems. In this
instance there is no danger of creating constitutional torts. This is
because the courts are not analyzing the sufficiency of medical
treatment per se. As a result, any malpractice issues are effectively
precluded. It is not idealistic but realistic to assume that as prison
medical facilities improve as a result of the application of a reasona-
ble and adequate care standard, then the number of individual
complaints alleging inadequate medical treatment will be reduced,
thus decreasing the danger of creating constitutional torts. It is
suggested, however, that even as these individual claims diminish,
a small number of legitimate individual complaints of inadequate
medical treatment will remain. In this context "deliberate indiffer-
ence" is still an inappropriate standard. "Shocking the conscience,"
which implies unreasonable behavior, is the logical corollary to the
reasonable and adequate standard advocated for use in assessing
medical facilities as a whole. Unfortunately, however, Estelle re-
mains deeply embedded in the case law, and its vestiges will con-
tinue to confuse and complicate the task of court and counsel.
VICKI C. THOMPSON
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